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THE GATT AND VAT: WHETHER VAT EXPORTERS ENJOY A
TAx ADVANTAGE UNDER THE GATT
I. INTRODUcTION
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT")
1
prohibits countries from refunding income taxes to exporters.2 In
contrast, refunds of value-added-taxes ("VAT") are permitted.
Advocates of a U.S. VAT argue that this distinction gives an
advantage to countries who rely primarily on VAT to collect
revenue.' In 1971, the United States attempted to counter the
alleged imbalance with the Domestic International Sales Corpora-
tion ("DISC").4 The DISC comprised a set of tax incentives by
which the United States could decrease the income tax burden on
its exporters.5 In 1984, the United States abandoned the DISC
and replaced it with the Foreign Sales Corporation ("FSC")
following lengthy struggles with its trading partners, who alleged
that the DISC scheme violated the GAT-6 U.S. trading partners
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. 5,55 U.N.T.S. 194
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1948). The GATT has been amended several times since 1947.
An official version of the amended GAIT is contained in 4 CONTRACTING PARTIES TO
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter GATT', BISD].
2. GAIT, BISD, supra note 1, at 31, 71.
3. Rep. Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.) suggests that the introduction of a value-added-tax
(VAT) in the United States would help to ensure a "level playing field" with overseas
competitors and would promote the United States' international competitiveness. Sam
Gibbons, A Proposal for a New Revenue System for the United States Incorporating a
Value-Added Tax, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 11, 1993, Doc. No. 98-46, available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, at *9. For a full discussion of the Gibbons proposal,
see William H. Morris, A 'National Debate' on VAT: The Gibbons Proposal, 60 TAX
NOTES 1259 (1993). For Gibbons' most recent comments on his VAT proposal, see Sam
Gibbons, Gibbons' Testimony at Bipartisan Commission Hearing on Entitlement and Tax
Reform, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 6, 1994, Doc. No. 198-36, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File.
4. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, at §§ 501-507, 85 Stat. 535 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. §§ 991-997 (1988 and Supp. 1994)).
5. Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the
DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1443 (1988).
6. See Hudec, supra note 5. The Foreign Sales Corporation was created as a
provision to the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1986).
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subsequently objected to FSC provisions that forgave approximate-
ly $10-12 billion in deferred taxes owed by U.S. exporters.7
Much of the debate surrounding the DISC, the FSC, and
current attempts to introduce a VAT in the United States
implicitly assumes that countries using a VAT enjoy an advantage
over their counterparts relying 
on income taxes.
a
This Comment analyzes whether countries using a VAT
system actually enjoy such an advantage under the GATI'T. First,
the VAT and the GATT restriction on the refund of direct taxes
to exporters are discussed. Second, the DISC and the FSC
schemes and current efforts to introduce a VAT in the United
States are examined. Third, the U.S. tax system and a potential
advantage enjoyed by imports is discussed. Finally, the relative
"effective" direct tax burdens of the United States and its
competitors are compared to see if VAT countries actually enjoy
any advantage under GATT. In order to compare effective tax
burdens, this Comment uses a hypothetical manufacturer in the
United States and compares his tax burden with a foreign
manufacturer. The comparison is limited to three VAT countries:
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
This Comment concludes that based on available data, the
GA'T's distinction between indirect and direct taxes may give
foreign exporters in VAT countries a tax advantage over the
United States.
II. THE GATT FRAMEWORK
A. What is a VAT?
A VAT is a "consumption tax" levied on sales of goods and
services. A VAT is computed by taxing the value added to a good
at each stage of production,9 normally at a flat rate.'0  In con-
7. Hudec, supra note 5, at 1443.
8. See Gibbons, Proposal, supra note 3, at *8-9.
9. James M. Bickley, How Much Revenue Could a U.S. VAT Yield?, 60 TAx NOTES
1273 (1993). For example, if A uses inputs valued at $100 in order to create a product sold
to B for $200 and a VAT rate of 10% is in effect, A is liable for 10% of the $100 value
added to the inputs or $10. For a more complete description of the VAT process, see
Joseph Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 N.Y.U. TAX L. REv. 283, 333-34
(1990).
10. Many countries use multi-tiered VAT rate dependent on the type of goods on
which the tax is levied. For example, France uses a two-tier system. Article 278 of the
French Tax Code applies a 5.6% tax rate to certain foods, lodging establishments, meals
650 [Vol. 17:649
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trast, a corporate income tax is levied only on a corporation's net
profits.11
VAT producers may generally offset taxes levied on interme-
diate stages of production with VAT collected from downstream
purchasers in order to prevent the double taxation of the same
value-added. 2
Proponents of a U.S. VAT frequently tout its simplicity and
revenue-raising possibilities.13  Other justifications for a U.S.
VAT are that it encourages savings14 and does not discriminate
between capital and non-capital goods or goods and services.15
Critics often focus on VAT's regressive nature by arguing that
a greater percentage of income is spent on consumption as income
levels fall.16 For example, assume A earns $20,000 per year and
spends $15,000 a year on living expenses such as food, clothing,
and rent. If a 10% VAT rate is in effect, he pays $1,500 dollars a
year in taxes, 7.5% of his income. B earns $100,000 a year. If his
living expenses are the same, the $1500 per year paid to the
government would only constitute 1.5% of his income. For B to
pay the same percentage of his income as A, he would have to
spend $75,000 a year.
17
served in company restaurants, camping establishments, entertainment, transportation fees,
medicines, and books. Code G~n~ral des Imp6ts [CGI] art. 278 bis (Fr.). An 18.6% rate
applies to any good or service that is not specifically enumerated bu the statute. CGI art.
272 bis. Manufactured goods do not as qualify for the reduced rate and are taxed at the
higher VAT rate.
11. See I.R.C. §§ 61-64 (1988). The U.S. corporate income tax applies graduated rates
of taxation to companies with higher earnings. I.R.C. § 11 (1988 & VI Supp. 1994).
Companies with net earnings over ten million dollars pay a 35% on all earnings. Id.
12. Isenbergh, supra note 9, at 333.
13. Gibbons, Proposal, supra note 3, at *2. In addition to being easier to administer,
compliance with VAT is frequently considered "cheaper and easier" for the taxpayer.
Morris, supra note 3, at 1261. Not only is less time spent by the taxpayer, but fewer
accountants and lawyers are needed to determine a taxpayer's liabilities. Id
14. It is commonly assumed that indirect taxes such as VAT and sales taxes encourage
savings by discouraging consumption. See Isenbergh, supra note 9, at 331 ("It makes
intuitive sense to tax those things we want less of and to refrain from taxing things we
want more of. Increasingly, consumption is the only thing we've plenty of.").
15. Morris, supra note 3, at 1262.
16. See id at 1264 ("Perhaps the central criticism of any VAT is that it is a regressive
tax."). For a complete discussion of the regressiveness issue, see Perry D. Quick, The
Politics of the Value-Added Tax: Distribution Issues, 93 TAX NOTES TODAY, June 22,1993,
Doc. No. 135-72, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File.
17. But see Morris, supra note 3, at 1264 ("While in any one year, those on a lower
income will spend more of their income than middle- and higher-income earners, if one
takes a longer view of the lifetime income and consumption cycle, then most middle-
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B. The GATT
Article XVI:4 of the GATT forbids countries from using
subsidies to aid exporters.18 Signatories to the GATT must
"cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on
the export of any product ... [which] results in the sale of such
product for export at a price lower than the comparable price
charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market."'1 9
An interpretive note states "the exemption of an exported product
from duties or taxes borne by the product when destined for
domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in
amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be
deemed to be a subsidy."2 The GATT is interpreted as prohibit-
ing the refund of direct income taxes because the note only
mentions the permissibility of indirect tax refunds.
21
The theory behind the disparate treatment of direct and
indirect taxes is that producers shift the cost of indirect taxes
forward to the consumer but that direct taxes are absorbed by the
producer.22 Relieving the direct tax exporter of the tax burden
constitutes a subsidy because the price of the product sold abroad
is cheaper than the price of the same product sold domestically.
23
For example, if A, an exporter in a direct tax system, is taxed
$1 on a $9 good, he will absorb some or all of the cost of the tax
himself, resulting in a price between $9 to $10. If A charges $9.50
in the direct tax system country but receives a rebate of the tax for
income families also will spend all of their income over a lifetime.'").
18. GATT, BISD, supra note 1, at 31.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 71.
21. See Oliver Oldman & Alan Schenk, The Business Activities Tax: Have Senators
Danforth & Boren Created a Better Value Added Tax?, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 19,
1994, Doc. No. 250-33, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, at *9 n.36.
22. See. id. ("The GATT rules reflect prevailing views that sales taxes [and] VAT are
shifted forward and are borne by the consumers, while income and payroll taxes are borne
by owners and shareholders and employees."); see also Isenbergh, supra note 9, at 333
("Any person who consumes the goods (and therefore does not add value) cannot perforce
turn them over again, and therefore cannot be reimbursed. The ultimate consumer, thus,
bears the final nonrefundable burden of the VAT."); Gerard M. Brannon, Does VAT
Provide a Balance of Trade Advantage?, 30 TA NOTES 1387, 1388 (1986) ("[T]here is a
consensus among economists that (a) the income tax is not shifted; (b) a VAT would be
passed forward in prices ... ").
23. Ronald D. Sernau, The Foreign Sales Corporation Boondoggle, 71 CORNELL L.
REv. 1181, 1185 n.24 (1986).
[Vol. 17:649
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his exports, the cost of his product abroad would be lower than
$9.50.24 The GATT considers this to be a subsidy.25
Conversely, the price of a product sold by an indirect
producer abroad will be the same as the domestic price.2 6  The
GATT assumes that in an indirect tax system, the price of the
good remains constant-the consumer merely pays the tax when
purchasing the product.27 The actual price of the good will be $9
whether sold domestically or abroad.2 8
The forward-shifting theory is not universally accepted; some
commentators suggest that direct tax benefits are shifted forward
like indirect taxes, and some suggest indirect taxes are not
completely shifted forward.29 The incidence of the VAT may fall
on manufacturers, consumers and laborers alike." The tax is not
borne only by goods and services but is rather "a proportionate tax
on the factors of production-that is, a tax on labor and capital
services."31
24. Id.
25. Id. ("The GATT theory rejects the proposition that prices decrease because
American manufacturers pass their tax savings forward.").
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id at 1184 ("Modem economic theory establishes that the GATT distinction
between direct and indirect taxes is artificial. Economists generally agree that exporters
in indirect tax jurisdictions do not fully shift tax savings forward to consumers. Similarly,
economists contend that exporters shift some direct tax benefits forward."); see also
Morris, supra note 3, at 1261 n.10 (stating that the contention that VAT taxes are
completely absorbed by the consumer "assumes a very inelastic demand curve that seems
far from certain.").
30. See Cliff Massa & David G. Raboy, The Canadian Value-Added Tax: Does
Anybody Care?, 89 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 25, 1989, Doc. No. 43-58, available
in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, at *10.
31. Id. In their discussion of the incidence of value-added taxes, Massa and Raboy
take the tax base of the corporate income tax and incremental increasing the tax base to
that of the VAT by removing the common CIT deductions such as payments on capital,
fringe benefits and other business expenses, allowing for full loss offset instead of the
current depreciation deduction system, and repealing the income cap on payroll taxes and
shifting their full cost to the employer. Id No increment individually shifts the costs of
the tax forward to the consumer and, viewed collectively, there is no reason to treat the
incidence of the VAT as any different from that of the CIT. Id. The VAT base is also
decreased to that of the CIT with similar results. Id Thus, there is no justification for
treating the incidence of the VAT and the CIT differently. Id
Some commentators have suggested that the extent to which a U.S. VAT would shift
forward in prices would depend on the monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve
Bank. See, e.g. Charles E. McLure, Jr., State and Local Implications of a Federal Value-
Added Tax, 38 TAX NoTEs 1517, 1524 (1988); Brannon, supra note 22, at 1388.
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The GATI distinction becomes blurred if indirect taxes are
at least partially absorbed by the producer, or if the direct tax
producer's lower overseas price is not the result of a subsidy but
rather the result of the producer passing his tax savings forward to
the consumer. 2  In other words, the GATT distinction may
unfairly punish exporters in direct tax jurisdictions in either of two
ways. First, if direct taxes are shifted forward to the consumer,
disallowing the border tax adjustment may place the exporter's
goods at a disadvantage in the export market because the good's
price still retains a direct tax component and is consequently more
expensive than domestic goods. Second, if indirect taxes are
partially absorbed by the producer, the border tax adjustment may
constitute a subsidy by allowing a rebate greater than the amount
of tax passed forward to the consumer and consequently renders
the price of the indirect tax exporter's goods cheaper than
domestic goods in the export market. 4
The introduction of the DISC35 and the subsequent introduc-
tion of the FSC3 6 suggest Congress believed the GATr distinction
was false.37
32. Semau, supra note 23, at 1181-84.
33. Cf. McLure, supra note 31, at 1525 (stating that the use of the GATT border
adjustment by U.S. exporters that would result from the replacement of the CIT with the
VAT could, if direct taxes are passed forward, "unshift" the price component passed on
in American exports).
34. See Sernau, supra note 23, at 1184 n.26 (citing KENNETH DAM, THE GATT LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 214-15 (1970)).
35. See infra discussion at Part II.A.
36. See infra discussion at Part II.B.
37. Sernau, supra note 23, at 1185 ("Congress accepted the modem view that no
appreciable difference exists between the impact of direct and indirect taxes on prices...
[and] designed the DISC legislation's benefits to equalize American exporters with foreign
counterparts exporting from countries providing indirect tax refunds and exemptions.").
The DISC legislation was also a reaction to the use of "tax-havens" by certain
European countries that the U.S. believed constituted a subsidy under Article XVI of the
GATT. Hudec, supra note 5, at 1447. The United States used the latter justification in
its defense of the DISC legislation during the GAT' proceedings described below;
however, the "long standing complaint about ... the accepted practice of remitting value-
added and other such taxes on exported goods and of imposing such taxes on imports,
received almost equal attention during the process of [DISC's] enactment. Id. at 1447
654
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III. Congressional Attempts to "Level the Playing Field"
A. Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC)
The DISC was enacted in 1971 as a device to reduce income
taxes and "level the playing field" for U.S. exporters. 38 Although
modified in 1976, 39 the DISC survived through 1984 and is still
available for small exporters? °
U.S. trading partners objected to the DISC as a violation of
the GATiT's prohibition against subsidies; the European Commu-
nity brought a lawsuit in 1972 to enjoin the United States from
using the DISC program.41 The U.S. reaction to the European
suit was to bring counter-complaints against the Netherlands,
Belgium, and France, which alleged that the DISC program merely
mirrored tax structures already in place in these countries.42
The DISC was controversial not only within the GATT
community but also within the United States itself.43  A Carter
administration official declared that it would take a "miracle" for
38. Id. at 1446. The DISC sought to increase exports by decreasing taxes on U.S.
exports. A parent company would establish a domestic subsidiary, known as a DISC,
solely for the purpose of avoiding taxes. The DISC was not required to have any assets
or employees. I.R.C. §§ 991-993 (1982). The parent company would sell goods to the
DISC, which would then sell the goods abroad. Half of the profits would be distributed
to the parent company and taxed normally. Id. Taxes on the other half were deferred as
long as the profits remained undistributed and remained with the DISC. Id. The tax-free
deferral was the mechanism by which exports were encouraged. Although in theory only
a deferral, exporters eventually began to treat the plan as a complete tax exemption.
Hudec, supra note 5, at 1446.
39. The DISC program was modified to allow only tax benefits for the volume of
exports exceeding a specified amount computed over a four-year base period commencing
seven years before the exporter was entitled to the deferral. I.R.C. §§ 991-993 (1982).
Hudec estimates that under the previous version of DISC, a corporation could defer taxes
on approximately 25% of its profits, while under the modified version, it is only able to
defer 17-18% of its profits. Hudec, supra note 5, at 1447.
40. Sernau, supra note 23, at 1181. Small exporters must now pay interest on the taxes
deferred by the program. Id.
41. Hudec, supra note 5, at 1443. The various complaints and counter-complaints,
collectively known as the DISC case, were litigated for over 12 years ending "with an
outcome that satisfied almost no one." Id.
42. See id. at 1445. The counter-complaints also served a political purpose by
"assuring Congress that the Administration was vigorously defending United States
Interests." Id. at 1457. The strategy of filing counterclaims may have been devised before
the actual complaints themselves were discovered. Id
43. James L. Rowe Jr., DISC's seem likely to die in Carter Tax Revision Package,
WASH. POST, July 24, 1977, at G1.
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the program to survive the administration.' The Treasury
Department argued that the program had not proven to benefit
trade whatsoever.45 Commerce Secretary Frank Weil noted,
however, that 85% of the nation's exports went through the
DISC's and, while conceding that the overall effect could not be
measured, Weil stated that the program was "bound to do some-
thing.
46
B. The Foreign Sales Corporation
The Foreign Sales Corporation provisions of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984 attempted to appease U.S. trading partners;
most importantly, the provisions were directed at the EC countries,
by eliminating the bulk of the DISC program while still retaining
tax incentives for U.S. exporters. 47 The provisions replaced the
DISC with the FCS' and, more significantly, relieved DISCs of
approximately $10-12 billion in deferred taxes owed under the
program. 49 European trading partners maintained that the relief
violated the GAT's prohibition against subsidies.5" Additional-
ly, Europeans were "convinced that Congress' forgiving the $10
billion plus [was] simply concrete evidence that they [were] correct
in calling DISC an illegal export subsidy all along."
51
44. Id.
45. Id
46. Id.
47. Semau, supra note 23, at 1181.
48. While the DISC system did not require the DISC subsidiary of the parent
corporation to have any assets or employees, and was thus purely a creation on paper, the
FCS requires the subsidiary to incorporate in either the United States possession, other
than Puerto Rico, or a country with which the United States had an exchange of
information agreement. I.R.C. § 922 (1988). In addition, the subsidiary must establish a
foreign presence by establishing an office outside the United States. Id There are also
foreign-management and foreign-economic-presence requirements. Id.; see also Sernau,
supra note 23, at 1190-91.
49. The ultimate irony of the FCS provisions was that they were contained in a deficit
reduction act. See Hobart Rowen, The Great Tax Grab, WASH. POST, July 5, 1985, at A21
("The callousness of the $10 billion to $12 billion giveawayin DISC ... takes the cake...
[i]t seems that when the corporations and their tax lawyers go to work in earnest, the
public gets ripped off.").
50. Stephen M. Kotran, Of DISC's and FSC's, 24 TAx NOTEs 8 (1984).
51. Id.
656 [Vol. 17:649
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C. Proposals to Introduce a VAT
Representative Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.), the Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee before the recent midterm
elections, recently proposed the introduction of a VAT to replace,
or at least supplement, the current income tax system. 2  The
VAT is not a new addition to the ongoing debate over the
restructuring of the U.S. tax system. Another Former Chairman
of the House Ways and Means Committee, Representative Al
Ullman (D-Ore.), had advocated introduction of a U.S. VAT in
1980, but the debate dissipated with his defeat that same year. 3
Retired Senators David Boren and John Danforth recently
proposed the introduction of a "Business Activities Tax," which
closely resembles a European style VAT system. 4 Other propos-
als include "sales-subtraction business tax" by Senator William
Roth (R-Del.), proposed in 1985, and a "sales-subtraction business
alternative minimum tax," introduced in 1985."5 In 1993, Senators
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), and Pete Dominici (R-N.M.), co-chaired the
Strengthening of America Commission, which issued a report
recommending a VAT.56
Gibbons advocates the subtraction method57 over the credit-
52. Gibbons, Proposal, supra note 3. Former Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen,
however, recently told reporters "I know of no plans to move toward a value-add-
ed-none." White House Has No Plans to Move Toward Value-Added Tax, Bentsen Says,
BNA Management Briefing (Oct. 28, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnews
File.
53. For a discussion of Ullman's proposal, see L. Hart Wright, Personal, Living or
Family Matters and the Value Added Tax, 82 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1983). Representative
Al Ullman's advocacy of a VAT may have result in his 1980 defeat. See Morris, supra
note 3, at 1260.
54. For a complete discussion of the proposal, see Oldman & Schenk, supra note 21.
55. Id. at *2.
56. Ild. Some commentators have also proposed the adoption of a U.S. VAT. See,
e.g., Isenbergh, supra note 9, at 335 (proposing the adoption of a 25% VAT to replace
current payroll and income taxes).
57. See Oldman & Schenk, supra note 21, at *3. The subtraction method subtracts the
sum of all the inputs used by a manufacturer or a service corporation from the total value
of all taxable sales. This figure is then multiplied by the VAT rate to arrive at the tax
owed. See Morris, supra note 3, at 1262. If A purchases $100 in inputs and makes $200
in sales and a 10% VAT rate exists, he is liable for the VAT rate multiplied by the value
added ($100), or $10. The subtraction method is favored by Gibbons because it is better
suited towards the taxation of services, would not require new accounting systems, and
would in general impose less compliance burdens. Id Gibbons argues that the transition
to a subtraction method would be easier for the IRS. The credit invoice method, however,
is preferable for audit reasons because taxpayers are given an incentive to keep accurate
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invoice method" for calculating VAT.59 In addition, Gibbons'
proposal, and nearly every proposal for a U.S. VAT, embraces the
"destination principle" approach to VAT.' Under the destina-
tion principle, VAT is only charged at the point of sale.61
Imports are taxed upon entry into the United States, while
exporters are not only exempted from VAT on the final sale but
are entitled to a refund of previously paid VAT.62 Use of the
destination principle is central to the notion of "leveling the
playing field."'63
Although citing numerous reasons for introduction of a
VAT,' one of Gibbons primary arguments in favor of a U.S.
VAT is that it "give[s] our companies and workers a fair chance
records in order to receive a tax refund, and the resulting paper trail makes it easier to
detect fraud. Sernau, supra note 23, at 1184.
58. Morris, supra note 3, at 1262.
59. Most VAT countries use the credit-invoice method. See Bickley, supra note 9, at
1273 ("The nearly universal method of calculating VAT is the credit-invoice method.").
Taxes previously paid by a manufacturer are subtracted from the taxes collected on
its sales. Thus, if A pays $20 in taxes purchasing its inputs of $100, receives $10 in taxes
from sales of $200, and a 10% VAT rate is in effect, A would receive a refund of $10. For
a more complete discussion and illustration of the credit-invoice mechanism, see Isenbergh,
supra note 9, at 333-34.
60. See Morris, supra note 3, at 1268.
61. See id.
62. Oldman & Schenk, supra note 21, at *9. All countries that impose a VAT use the
destination approach. Id. The refund is accomplished by "zero-rating" exporters, which
entitles the exporter to a refund of VAT already paid. A VAT "exemption exempts the
final sale but does not allow for a refund of previously paid VAT." Id. at *13.
A typical example of a VAT "zero-rating" refund is included in the French Tax Code.
Articles 256,262, and 263 of the CGI provide exporters with a "recapture mechanism" for
VAT already paid and an exemption for the final sale as long as it is proven that the
goods were actually exported. See Cambell & Philippart, Business Operations in
France-Taxation, Tax Mgmt. (BNA), Foreign Income Portfolios, No. 961, at A-102
(1993). For a discussion of similar provisions in the German tax code, see Dr. Juergen
Killius & Radler R. Bezzenberger, Business Operation in Germany-Taxation, Tax Mgmt.
(BNA), Foreign Income Portfolios, No. 962, at A-63 (citing USTG § 4 et seq. (1980)).
63. See Morris, supra note 3, at 1268. If the destination principle is used, United
States exports remain tax-free but imports are taxed at a normal VAT rate, thus resulting
in a boost to United States exports, and simultaneously imposing a larger tax burden on
imports.
Use of the "origin principle," whereby exports are taxed and imports are exempted,
would only make sense in a country with a large trade surplus--more revenue could be
generated by taxing imports. A country-by-country approach is, of course, ideal: exports
to countries with whom a trade surplus is maintained would be taxed while imports from
countries with whom a trade deficit is maintained would be taxed. See generally id
64. Some of the reasons cited by Gibbons include: (1) increased productivity, (2)
increased savings and investment, and (3) savings resulting from the ease of determining
and paying taxes. I&
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to compete. Other countries, including most of our principal
international competitors, already use a VAT, which automatically
exempts their exports from tax. 65 The notion that the VAT will
increase the international competitiveness of U.S. firms is common
among many U.S. VAT advocates.66
The introduction of a retail sales tax or VAT alone could only
improve the U.S. trade balance if VAT taxes are not completely
forward shifted.67 Partially or completely replacing the corporate
income tax (CIT) with a VAT could produce trade advantages if
either direct taxes are forward shifted or indirect taxes are not.
68
If direct taxes increase prices but are not border adjusted, it may
be advantageous to switch to the an indirect tax which may be
permissibly rebated under the GATT because the reversal of the
"mismatch" may result in lower prices for the exported good.69
In addition to largely ignoring the prevailing views on the
forward shifting of direct and indirect taxes, the argument that the
U.S. is at a competitive disadvantage does not take into account
the fact that VAT countries also levy direct taxes.
70
Whether VAT exporters actually enjoy a tax advantage over
American exporters depends largely on two factors. First, the
extent of any advantage given by the GATT distinction between
direct and indirect taxes. Second, whether any advantage given to
VAT countries is offset by the direct tax burden imposed on
exporters in VAT countries. The discussion that follows focuses
on the second proposition by contrasting the direct tax burdens in
the United States and in three VAT countries. Before comparing
the relative tax burdens, a brief discussion of the taxation of U.S.
exports and imports is presented.
65. Id
66. See Brannon, supra note 22, at *1 ("There has been a spate of discussions of a
direct consumption tax, emphasizing that switching to such a tax would produce a valuable
balance of trade advantage for the U.S.").
67. McLure, supra note 31, at 1524; see also Gilbert E. Metcalf, Value-Added Taxation:
A Tax Whose Time Has Come?, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 130 (1995) (asserting that a
destination style VAT would have no effect on the balance of trade).
68. See, e.g. Mclure, supra note 31, at 1525.
69. Brannon, supra note 22, at 1389.
70. See, e.g., Sernau, supra note 23, at 1184 ("This note divides the world into indirect
and direct tax jurisdictions for illustrative purposes. Most countries use both forms of
tax.").
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IV. U.S. INCOME TAXES
A. Introduction
U.S. corporations are taxed on all worldwide income.7'
Foreign corporations are only taxable in the United States on
sources of income "connected with the conduct of a trade or
business within the United States,"72 or on gross income derived
from U.S. sources but not "effectively connected" to a trade
business in the United States.73
B. The Foreign Tax Credit (FTC)
Although a U.S. corporation's worldwide income is taxable,
tax credits, or deductions for certain categories of taxes,74 may be
used to offset taxes paid in foreign countries. 75  Section 901
avoids the problem of double taxation. Section 901 allows a tax
credit to citizens and domestic corporations for the amount of any
"income, war profits, and excess profits taxes paid or accrued
during the taxable year to any foreign country."7
The section 901 credit is limited to the amount of foreign
taxes actually paid.77 Otherwise, a taxpayer who pays more in
foreign taxes than his corresponding liability in the United States
could use the extra foreign tax paid to offset income unrelated to
the taxpayer's foreign activities.78
71. I.R.C. § 1 (1988).
72. Id. § 871(b).
73. Id. § 871(a). Such income is taxed at a flat rate of 30%. Id.
74. A credit operates as a dollar-for-dollar reduction on an individual's tax liability.
A deduction only partially offsets an individual's liability. For example, if A owes $10 to
the IRS and receives a credit of $1, he will have to pay $9 in taxes. If he is only entitled
to a deduction, the deduction merely reduces his taxable income. If A has $100 of income
and is in a 40% tax bracket, he will be taxed at 40% of $99.
75. See generally id §§ 901-904 (1988).
76. Id. § 901(a) (1988).
77. Id. § 904.
78. For example, A, a U.S. exporter, earns $100 profit on goods in France and pays
$50 in taxes to the government of France. The IRS would have imposed only $30 in taxes.
If the tax credit is not limited, A could offset $20 against income unrelated to his activities
in country X or use it as a loss.
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C The Source Rules
The rules that determine whether income is derived from
sources within or without the United States-the sourcing
rules-are established in sections 861-65 of the Internal Revenue
Code.79 These rules determine whether a U.S. or foreign
corporation's income is taxable and, for U.S. corporations, whether
any taxes owed in the United States may be offset with a foreign
tax credit.
The general "sourcing" rule is that income from the sale of
personal property by a U.S. citizen is sourced within the United
States.' In actuality, the rule is swallowed by its exceptions.
Sale of goods transactions are not governed by section 865(a)
because section 865(b) exempts income from the sale of inventory
property"1 from the general rule of section 865(a). Instead,
sourcing is determined by sections 861(a), 862(a)(6), and 863(b).'
Section 861(a)(6) applies to purchases of inventory in the
United States and their sale outside of the United States and vice-
versa.83 The place of sale is determinative of the source of in-
come. 4 The key to determining where a product is sold under
section 861(a)(6) is to determine where the sale occurs.8" The
"place of sale" is defined as the "place where rights, title, and
interest of the seller in the property are transferred to the
buyer. '8 6 The sale occurs where the title passes except "in any
case in which the sales transaction is arranged in a particular
manner for the primary purpose of tax avoidance."'  In these
cases, the Treasury considers factors such as the place of negotia-
tions, the place of execution of the agreement, the place of
79. Id § 865 (1988).
80. Id § 865 (1988).
81. Inventory property is defined in § 861(i)(1) as personal property as defined by
section 1221 of the IRC. Id. § 861(i)(1). Section 1221's definition is interpreted to include
pure selling activities and not sales resulting from the culmination of a manufacturing
process. JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAX 137.
82. I.R.C. § 865(b) (1988).
83. Id § 861(a)(6) (1988).
84. 2 BORIS I. BIT'KER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIrFS 70.6.3 (1991).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1957).
86. Id.
87. Id
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payment, and the location of the property when determining
whether the transaction was arranged to avoid taxation.88
The "title passage" or "place of sale" principle has significant
consequences for foreign importers and U.S. exporters. A foreign
importer can structure a transaction so that title passes in the
foreign country and escape taxation on the manufacturing
component of a transaction. 9  U.S. exporters can structure
transactions to generate foreign source income' and, consequent-
ly, foreign tax credits.91 Attempts to blatantly manipulate the
place of sale rule, however, through the use of overseas subsidiar-
ies may encounter a number of difficulties. First, the place of sale
may be recast if the principle purpose of the structure of the
transaction is tax avoidance.' Second, attempts to manipulate
the prices and profits attributable to foreign source and U.S.
income may pose section 482 problems.93 Third, attempts to
88. Id.
89. Problems arise if the foreign manufacturer has an office or other fixed place of
business in the United States because of taxation treaties between the United States and
its trading partners. See Francene M. Augustyn, A Primer for Incorporating Under the
Income Tax Laws of France, Germany, or the United Kingdom, 7 J. INT'L L. Bus. 267, 315
(1985). Some of the income from the manufacturing component could be attributed to the
permanent establishment. Id. It is assumed that the foreign manufacturer in this paper
does not have a permanent establishment in the United States. See also Treas. Reg. 1.864-
7 (defining office and fixed place of business).
90. Title to inventory property is purchased in the United States and is passed outside
the United States; the profits from the sale are thus deemed foreign source income.
I.R.C. § 862(a)(6) (Supp. 1993); see also Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based
Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 32 n.57
(1993).
91. See Caroline A Krass, A Guide to the Source of Income Rules for the Sale and
Purchase of Inventory Property, 45 TAX LAW. 857, 858-89 (1992). The tax credit rules
assure that the U.S. exporter exporting to a country with a lower rate of taxation pays the
same rate of taxation as a domestic producer. Id. Excess tax credits may be credited
towards other taxable years. Id.
92. See infra text accompanying note 88.
93. One of the goals of section 482 was to address the problem of corporations hiding
profits from U.S. taxation by false intercompany pricing. See Joseph R. Gauche, Section
482: Past and Present Significant Section 482 Litigation, in TRANSFER PRICING AND THE
FOREIGN OWNED CORPORATION 119 (1991) ("[The purpose of section 482 is to] prevent
evasion (by the shifting of profits, the making of fictitious sales, and other methods
frequently adopted for the purpose of 'milking'), and in order to clearly reflect the true
tax liability.") (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1927)).
In cases where two or more organizations are indirectly or directly owned by the
same interest, section 482 allows the Secretary to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross
income ... among such organizations . .. if he determines that such distribution ... is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or to clearly reflect the income of any such
organizations." I.R.C. § 482 (1988).
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retain profits at the overseas subsidiary level, and thus receive a
deferral of taxation, could result in the recharictarization of the
profits as distributions to the shareholders under the controlled
foreign corporation rules.94
Inventory produced within the United States and directly sold
in a foreign country or inventory produced in a foreign country
and directly sold in the United States are deemed to have both
foreign source and U.S. source components.95 Section 863(b)
gives the Treasury the power to determine the formula for dividing
foreign source and U.S. source income for manufactured goods.'
The Treasury uses three techniques for determining the
portion within the United States and without the United States.97
Regulation 1.863-3 states that where a "producer regularly sells
part of his output to wholly independent distributors ... in such
way as to establish fairly and independent factory or production
price ... the taxable income attributable to sources within the
United States shall be computed ... at the independent factory
price so established.,
98
In sum, if the producer is in the regular business of using a
middleman to sell overseas, the profits gained in the sale to the
middleman are used to compute the portion of profits attributable
to sources within the United States in sales to its own overseas
distributing branch. 99 The U.S. source component, or profit from
the sale to the middleman is used to compute the U.S. source
income in sales to its distributing branch.'0°
Another method relies on the records of the manufacturer to
determine the portion of profits attributable to U.S. source in-
come. 01 The regulation allows the taxpayer to calculate the
source allocation on the basis of his own records if he "in good
faith and unaffected by considerations of tax liability, regularly
employs in his books ... a detailed allocation of receipts ... which
94. See id §§ 951-967.
95. Id § 863(b)(2); see also BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 84, at 70.6.3.
96. I1& ("[Tihe portion of such taxable income attributable to sources within the
United States may be determined by processes of formulas of general apportionment
prescribed by the Secretary.").
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3 (1957).
98. 1& example 1.
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.8633(b)(2) (example 1); BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 84, at
70.6.3.
100. BrrTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 84, at 70.6.3.
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3, example 3 (1957).
1995]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
reflects more clearly than the processes or formulas herein
prescribed the taxable income derived from sources within the
United States."'1 2
The burden is on the taxpayer to prove that his records are
more reliable than the method prescribed by the Treasury. 3 As
a result, this method is infrequently used. 1"M
The final method uses a specific formula to divide domestic
and foreign source income.10 5 Taxable income is divided into
two portions. One half is allocated to the place of sale and the
other half is dependent on the portion of the taxpayer's property
within and without the United States."° If a U.S. producer
exports to foreign countries and does not produce goods overseas
for sale in the United States, the sales half is entirely foreign
source income. 1°7 If a foreign producer sells in the United States
and does not sell goods manufactured in the United States to
foreign countries, the sales half is entirely U.S. source income.08
V. THE FOREIGN TAx BURDEN
A. Introduction
A foreign corporation is one created or incorporated under the
laws of a foreign jurisdiction or a U.S. possession."° As dis-
cussed above, because of the passage of title principle it is fairly
easy to overcome a portion of the taxation imposed on imports or
for U.S. manufacturers to receive a tax credit for exports."0
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. ISENBERGH, supra note 81, at 177-81.
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3T, example 2 (1957).
106. Id.
107. B=ITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 84, at 1 70.6.3. For example, a U.S. producer
makes a total profit of $100 on the sale of manufactured inventory. Fifty dollars is
assigned to the place of sale and because the producer does not produce goods overseas
for sale in the United States, all $50 is foreign source income. All the producer's property
is located in the United States and thus the remaining $50 is U.S. source income. If the
United States imposes a 30% tax rate, the producer's U.S. tax liability would be $30. If
the foreign government imposes an additional tax of $20 on the sale in the foreign country,
the producer would receive a $20 tax credit to be applied against the $15 deemed foreign
source income. The excess tax credit of $5 could be applied to other years and the
producer's total tax liability would be $35.
108. Id.
109. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4); see also BrTrYER & LOKKEN, supra note 84, at 1 65.3.
110. See infra discussion at Part 1V.C.
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Imports are generally taxed if they are produced or bought in a
foreign country and then sold or exchanged in the United States.
Under GATT, any VAT taxes imposed on the transaction may be
refunded when the goods are exported. In contrast, the U.S.
manufacturer must pay at least a portion of his manufacturing
profits to the United States because of the export sourcing rules.
Furthermore, the refund of this type of direct tax is not permis-
sible under the GAT rules.
Thus, the GATT distinction between indirect and direct taxes
and the advantage given to foreign corporations and foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. parents under the passage of title rule may
favor exporters in VAT countries. It is this contention that is
relied on by Gibbons and other proponents of a United States
VAT. The premise is that American manufacturers are put at a
disadvantage in international trade by the GATIT's prohibition of
direct tax refunds and the permissibility of indirect tax refunds. In
addition to assuming that the VAT is not "forward shifted" or that
direct taxes are forward shifted, many proponents of a U.S. VAT
also assumes that VAT countries do not levy significant direct
taxes; however, virtually every country uses a mix of indirect and
direct taxes.111  Even assuming that the GATT distinction does
give VAT exporters an advantage, the use of direct taxes in VAT
jurisdictions may partially offset any advantages under the GATT.
B. Foreign Tax Systems
Unlike the United States, which holds corporations liable for
all worldwide income, the French tax system is based on the
principle of territoriality: "the tax law is not applicable beyond
French territorial limits."
' 2
The French corporation" 3 is subject to the corporate income
tax currently levied at 33 1/3%.114 Foreign business entities are
111. The United States already imposes indirect taxes such as the state sales tax. In
fact, the sales tax operates much like VAT because it taxes the value of the good rather
than the profits from a particular transaction. For a discussion of the differences between
a retail sales tax and a VAT, see Massa & Raboy, supra note 30.
112. Augustyn, supra note 89, at 269. French territories are defined to include
Metropolitan France, Corsica, and France's "overseas departments". Id.
113. The following business entities are subject to the French corporate income tax: the
stock corporation, the limited liability company, and the limited partnership. Id. at 271.
114. CGI art. 219. In 1985, a flat rate of 50% was imposed on many business entities.
See Augustyn, supra note 89, at 270. The lower rate may have been a reaction to the large
tax cuts introduced in the United States by the 1986 reforms. John G. Wilkins, Coopers
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subject to the French corporation income tax if they have a
permanent establishment in France."5 A variety of exemptions
and credits not relevant to this discussion are provided to French
business entities.Y
6
The German tax system imposes unlimited tax liability on
residents and limited liability for non-residents.' 7  It is thus
closer to the "worldwide profits" approach of the United States
than to the territorial approach of France." 8
The German corporation tax is currently levied at 45%
percent." 9 Entities subject to the German corporate income tax
are the stock corporation, the limited liability company, and the
partnership limited by shares.2 °
Like the German system, the United Kingdom imposes
liability on the worldwide profits of "resident" corporations and on
the domestic source income of non-residents.'2' Residency is not
dependent on the place of incorporation but rather on the location
of central management and control. 22 Income tax treaties gener-
ally render the resident and non-resident's tax liability the
& Lybrand Director Testifies on International Competitiveness, 91 TAX NOTES TODAY, July
19, 1991, Doc. No. 152-37, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File at *4-5 (statement
of John G. Wilkins before the Committee on Ways and Means U.S. House of Representa-
tives Hearings on Factors Affecting U.S. International Competitiveness) ("Following the
move of the United States, the EEC countries lowered their corporate income tax rates
about 12 1/2 percent, from a 1986 average of 46.4 percent to a 1991 average tax rate of
40.6 percent.").
115. Augustyn, supra note 89, at 270. The definition of a permanent establishment is
normally defined by treaty. Id This Comment assumes that the definition is met.
116. Tax exemption is provided to corporations located in certain "enterprise zones"
in France in order to encourage industrial investment in these regions. CGI art. 208
quinquies (I)(1) (1993). Tax exemption is also provided to new businesses formed after
October 1, 1988. CGI art. 44 sexies (1993).
117. See Augustyn, supra note 89, at 273.
118. Like U.S. corporations, German corporations may be liable for certain types of
foreign source income. Thus, a German manufacturer may be liable for profits on the
retailing transaction in the United States; however, the manufacturing component of the
transaction is most important to this discussion.
119. Perry D. Quick & Thomas Neubig, Tax Burden Comparison: U.S. vs. the Rest of
the G-7, 65 TAX NOTES 1409, 1418 (1994). A thirty percent rate is levied on distributed
earnings. Id.
120. Augustyn, supra note 89, at 273.
121. Id. at 274.
122. Id. The primary factor in determining central management and control is the
location of directors' meetings. Id. at 237.
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same." The U.K. corporation is liable for thirty-three percent
of its profits.
24
A significant difference between the three countries is
France's reliance on the territoriality principle. The French
manufacturer or American subsidiary can escape French taxation
on the retailing component of the transaction; however, the
existence of tax credit provisions in the United Kingdom and
Germany render this difference less meaningful. 25 The total tax
on the retailer is largely determined by the rate of U.S. taxation.
In contrast, the tax on the manufacturing component of a
foreign or American subsidiary is determined by the host countries
corporate tax rate.
C. Comparative Effective Tax Rates
There are a variety of methods of measuring comparative tax
rates. Top statutory corporate tax rates fail to accurately measure
comparative tax burdens because of differences in tax bases, but
they may provide some indication of "a tax environment that is
friendly or hostile toward high-income or business taxpayers within
a country or state." '126 Top statutory corporate income tax rates
are 33.3% in France, 45% in Germany,127 and 33% in the United
Kingdom. 2 The current top statutory rate in the United States
is 35%.129
Attempts to measure "effective" comparative corporate
income taxes may be more accurate. One method compares
123. Id. at 276 ("Where a nonresident company is [taxable by treaty], the computation
of liability on the chargeable profits of the permanent establishment corresponds generally
that of a United Kingdom resident company.").
124. Quick & Neubig, Tax Burden, supra note 119, at 1418.
125. Augustyn, supra note 89, at 279 ("[T]his apparent advantage is minimized when
it is recognized that worldwide taxing regimes generally allow for a credit or deduction for
foreign taxes paid.").
126. Quick & Neubig, Tax Burden, supra note 119, at 1418 (table 8); see also Perry D.
Quick & Thomas S. Neubig, Enterprise Economics and Tax Reform: Working Papers
Volume II, Comparing Tax Burdens, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY, October 13, 1994, Doc. No.
201-45, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File ("The economic significance of a
tax's burden depends on several distinct factors. First, what activities or objects are
included in the tax base, and what-if any-activities or objects ... receive special exemp-
tions?").
127. Thirty percent on distributed earnings. Quick & Neubig, Tax Burden, supra note
119, at 1418.
128. Id.
129. I.R.C. § 11 (1988 & VI Supp. 1994).
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corporate tax revenues as a percentage of total tax revenues. 130
Another measures corporate tax revenues as a percentage of total
gross domestic product (GDP).'3
Corporate income taxes generally account for a small percent-
age of overall government revenues in G-7132 countries and
average 8.8 %.133 The United States relies less on corporate
taxes to generate revenues; however, this percentage does not
necessarily measure the actual burdens faced by U.S. corporations
because a principal drawback of this measure is that changes in
other sources of revenue may produce a change in the corporate
percentage even if the corporate rates do not change."M U.S.
corporate income taxes have declined as a percentage of revenues
since 1970.135 Similar declines have occurred in the G-7
countries.1
36
As a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the
United States also stands in the middle of the G-7 countries. In
1988, corporate income taxes accounted for 2.5 percent of U.S.
GDP, 2.3 percent of French GDP, 2.0% of German GDP, and
4.0% of U.K. GDP. 137 This measure, however, fails "to show the
relative tax burden on similarly situated corporations because the
fraction of GDP accounted for by the corporate profit tax base can
differ among countries and change over time."'13
These methods also fail to account for the effects of the
double taxation of dividends in the United States where taxes are
imposed at the corporate level by the corporate income taxes and
130. Wilkins, supra note 114.
131. Id. at *15.
132. The G-7 stands for the group of 7 countries "considered the lead economies of the
world" and includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Id. at *5 n.3.
133. Neubig & Quick, Tax Burden, supra note 119, at 1415. U.S. corporate taxes
account for 7.3% of tax revenues. French and German corporate taxes account for only
4.5% and 4.3% of revenues respectively while in the United Kingdom, corporate taxes
account for 8.9% of revenues. Id.
134. See Wilkins, supra note 114.
135. Neubig & Quick, Tax Burden, supra note 119, at 1415-16. In 1970, corporate
income taxes accounted for 12.7% of total tax revenues in the United States and 10.9%
of G-7 revenues. Id. By 1991, these figures were 7.3% and 8.8% respectively. Id
136. Id.
137. Wilkins, supra note 114, at *14. In addition, France and Germany "paid out
nontax subsidies to businesses that exceeded the total income tax collected from
corporations." Id. at *12.
138. Id. at *8.
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at the shareholder level by personal income taxes.139 In contrast,
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom all allow some relief
from double taxation by "integration" of the two taxes.14° Ger-
many and France allow for total integration.
141
The integration is allowed at the shareholder level by
providing the taxpayer with a credit for taxes previously paid by
the corporation. 1 2  The integration does not affect corporate
income tax statistics because the integration occurs at the personal
income tax level; however, comparing effective rates of effective
taxation without any discussion of integration would be mislead-
ing-a corporations profits are not only taxed by the corporate
income tax but also when distributed. 143  A more accurate
comparison of cross-country tax rates accounts for the effects of
integration.
Some commentators suggest comparing effective tax rates
made on new investments.' In 1991, the United States taxed
domestic investment 37.5%. Germany's rate was only 15.3%, The
United Kingdom's rate was 28.6% and France's rate was
31.5 %.141 These commentators conclude that while the United
States has lower tax revenues as a percentage of GDP than many
of its trading partners,"4 comparison of effective rates on new
139. Neubig & Quick, Tax Burden, supra note 119, at 1418.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id
143. See id The double or even triple taxation of corporate profits, predictably, attracts
much criticism. See, e.g. Wilkins, supra note 114, at *4 (stating that the lack of integration
is one of the "critical problems" of the U.S. tax system).
144. Id Comparing the effective rates on new investments reflects taxation on both
new and old investments because "long lived assets such as machinery and structures are
depreciated over multiple years." Id at *23. In addition, tax policy "generally can
influence firms' decisions on new, but not existing investments." Id.
145. Another methodology suggested by Neubig and Quick uses combined corporate
and individual income tax rates. Under this method, the United States places in the
middle of the pack. In 1991, France had the lowest combined rate of 6.4%, Germany had
a 13.2% rate, the United States had a 13.8% rate, and the United Kingdom had the
highest combined rate of 14.7%. Neubig & Quick, Tax Burden, supra note 119, at 1418
(table 9).
146. Id. at 1410. U.S. tax revenues as a percentage of total GDP were 29.8% in 1991.
Germany collected 39.2% of GDP, the United Kingdom collected 36.0% and France
collected 44.2%. France's extremely high figure probably results from its heavy reliance
on payroll taxes: France collects 40.1% of total tax revenues from payroll taxes. Id. at
1413. Payroll taxes have been ignored because it is unclear on whom the incidence of
these taxes fall. See id at 1421 ("International comparisons of tax rates on labor income
do not address who bears the burden of labor taxes.").
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investments reveals that "the United States has one of the highest
marginal tax rates on corporate capital income among the G-7
countries., 147  The average rate of U.S. taxation of inbound
investment into the United States also supports Gibbons' asser-
tions that the U.S. is at a competitive disadvantage with its
competitors. While effective average tax rates on domestic
investment are 37.5%, rates on inbound investment are only
36.7%.148
VI. CONCLUSION
The studies on cross-country tax burdens suggest that if VAT
taxes are not forward shifted or that direct tax benefits are forward
shifted, there is some justification for Gibbons' assertion that U.S.
corporations are at a competitive disadvantage with foreign
competitors. The magnitude of this advantage is unclear because
of the controversy surrounding the extent of forward shifting of
indirect and direct taxes and the scarcity and uncertainty of the
data surrounding comparative tax rates.
The partial replacement of the current corporate income tax
system with a VAT style tax could offset any advantage or even
give U.S. corporations an advantage by both lowering the direct
tax burden and by giving U.S. corporations the opportunity to take
advantage of the VAT refund. Any such advantage may be short
lived. The advantage could be eventually offset by changes in
exchange rates.149 . Furthermore, if seen as a blatant attempt to
manipulate GATT rules, retaliation would be a possibility. In
particular, VAT exporters could adjust their own corporate and
VAT rates to compensate for the U.S. readjustment. As a result,
although there are many strong arguments for a U.S. VAT,
international competitiveness alone seems a poor justification.15 °
Christopher Deal
147. Id at 1422.
148. Id
149. McLure, supra note 31, at 1525 ("[Any positive effect on competitiveness resulting
from such a shift in tax policy would probably be temporary, lasting only until offset by
adjustments in exchange rates."); Brannon, supra note 22, at 1389.
150. See McLure, supra note 31, at 1525 ("The uncertain and temporal benefits on
international trade that might result from substituting a VAT for part of the corporate
income tax or choosing it over other sources of additional revenues should not weigh
heavily in the decision of whether to follow such policies.").
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